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RADIATION INJURIES: STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS INADEQUACIES IN TORT CASESt

Samuel D. Estep* and Thomas W. Van Dyke**
1963 Consolidated Edison Company, which supplies electricity to the New York City metropolitan area, announced its
intent to build a very large nuclear reactor in the middle of that
city's millions of inhabitants.1 Predictably, there was a loud and
mixed reaction by various groups to the possible danger this might
create for the general public, as distinguished from the workers
who would operate the plant. One former chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission announced his opposition to such schemes
because so many people would be endangered by harmful exposure to radiation if it should accidentally be discharged beyond
the reactor site.2 After substantial periods of operation the cores
of such reactors inevitably contain large amounts of radioactive
fission products. Even The New York Times editorially questioned
the advisability of the proposed site for the same reasons. 8 Some
suggested that the city's legislative council should prohibit such
construction. 4 The ultimate decision in the dispute, however, will
be made by the AEC because constitutionally the federal government has paramount power and, in the opinion of the present
writers, 15 in the Atomic Energy Act of 19546 Congress superseded
all local regulatory power regarding nuclear safety in the siting
of such reactors. In the light of this conclusion, the reaction to
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Ford Foundation, and the W. W. Cook Endowment Fund for financial support of the
research on which this article is based.
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
•• Member of the Missouri Bar.-Ed.
1 N.Y. Times, May IO, 1963, p. 1, col. 4; Time, July 26, 1963, p. 42.
2 Lecture, "Whatever Happened to the Peaceful Atom?" delivered at Princeton
University, Feb. 19, 1963. On the other side, see CONG. REc.-Appendix A5657 (remarks
of Representative Holifield} (Sept. 9, 1963).
s N.Y. Times, May 31, 1963, p. 24, col. 5.
4 See note 1 supra.
15 See STASON, ESTEP &: PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAW 1002-74 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as ATOMS AND THE LAw]. See also Estep &: Adelman, State Control of Radiation Hazards:
An Intergovernmental Relations Problem, 60 MICH. L. REv. 41, 58-63 (1961). For an
earlier discussion, see Estep, Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime Private Atomic Energy Activities, 52 MICH. L. REv. 333 (1954).
6 68 Stat. 919 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1958).
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the announcement of still another group focuses upon a problem
which is more important to lawyers and to their clients.
The New York State Association of Trial Lawyers declared its
intent to draft and seek enactment of legislative provisions to
"overcome the absence of adequate common and statutory law on
the liability arising from accidents caused by atomic development
projects." 7 For some years a few lawyers have been warning the
bar and the legislatures that existing rules were not adequate to
handle the legal problems presented in radiation exposure cases.
An analysis of many of these problems is available elsewhere,8 but
there is one problem which has had very little and certainly inadequate attention in the opinion of the present writers, i.e., how
long after exposure to radiation should a potential plaintiff be
permitted to sue the allegedly liable defendant?
Some injuries from overexposure to radiation may manifest
themselves within existing statutory limitations periods, at least
under some liberal (or loose) judicial interpretations. Many injurious manifestations, however, will not arise for a great many
years after exposure; it is the thesis of this article that some new
legislative solutions must be adopted. Limiting the right to sue
to the existing time periods as construed by many courts will be
manifestly unfair to plaintiffs. A blanket, unconditional extension
of the time period to as much as thirty years for all cases regardless
of the local rule as to when the cause of action accrues, however,
will place unrealistic burdens on defendants. This article, after
first analyzing in detail the impact and inadequacies of existing
statutory time limitations for radiation cases, will outline some
more realistic provisions which legislatures should enact. The
analysis here will be limited to general tort liability cases, workmen's compensation problems already having been considered in
a companion article.9
One further initial comment should be made. The AEC will
have a difficult task in balancing the competing interests which
bear upon the request of Consolidated Edison Company to build
in the heart of New York City.* Responsible sources claim that at
long last competitive nuclear power is no longer just around the
corner, but is a present reality if huge generating stations are
built. The proof of these claims, however, lies in the building of
7 N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1963~ p. 21, col. I.
8 ATOMS AND THE LAW 1002-74.
9 Estep &: Allan, Radiation Injuries and
tion Cases, 62 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1963).

Time Limitations in Workmen's Compensa-

• After this article was in type, Consolidated Edison announced that it is withdrawing
its application at this time. Atomic Indus. Forum Memo, Jan. 1964, p. 5. ·
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operating plants. Clearly the economics of nuclear power will be
much better if the plants can be built close to the main consumers,
i.e., large population concentrations. On the other hand, no responsible scientist or engineer will assert categorically that a large
nuclear power plant cannot under any circumstances discharge
extremely dangerous radioactive material beyond the confines of
the reactor site. The AEC, therefore, conceivably could deny Consolidated's request. Nevertheless, neither this nor similar action
would significantly decrease the need for modification of statute of
limitations provisions. Although the numerous commercial power
reactors already built, under construction, or definitely planned,
are not so close to so many people as that proposed in New York
City, they are not at isolated sites far from human populations.
If a substantial accident should occur under the right conditions~
certainly hundreds or thousands of the general public could be
endangered, although in most accidents to date only employees
have been exposed. 10 Even more important perhaps in measuring
the need for immediate legal action is the potential hazard created
by transporting large quantities of radioactive waste from reactor
sites to burial grounds, and by the many thousands of much smaller
radiation sources now authorized under AEC license. Therefore,
it is now time to make some changes in our laws; the Consolidated
Edison request serves only to dramatize the problem. The limitations difficulty exists no matter how the questions of whether to
apply strict liability or negligence rules, of which types of injuries
to cover, and of how to prove causal connection are answered. 11
The statute of limitations problem cannot be avoided; enactment
of adequate statutory rules should not be delayed.
PRESENT LAW ON STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

A. When the Limitation Period Begins

In deciding whether or not an action is barred, the initial
determination usually involves the question of when the statute
10 See, e.g., Gomberg, Bassett 8: Velez, Report on the Possible Effects on the Surrounding Population of an Assumed Release of Fission Products into the Atmosphere from
!100-Megawatt Reactor Located at Lagoona Beach, Michigan (1957). For listings of actual
accidents, see Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Employee Radiation Hazards and Workmen's
Compensation, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 855-58 (1959); Goodman, Radiation Injuries, 5 ATOMIC
ENERGY L.J. 20 (196!1); Saenger, Radiation Accidents, 84 AM. J. RoENTGENOLOGY 715, 722
(1960).
11 See detailed analysis of these questions in ATOMS AND THE LAw. See also Estep,
Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to Injury Litigation,
59 MICH. L. REv. 259 (1960).
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started to run. Approximately ninety percent of the state statutes
mark the beginning of the limitation period at the time the cause
of action "accrued."12 Of the remaining states, Florida and Wisconsin provide that an action shall be brought "within" the specified
period; 13 Pennsylvania requires that suit be filed within a certain
number of years "from the time when the injury was done"; 14
Delaware and Louisiana measure the period from the date the
damages or injuries "were sustained"; 15 in Connecticut suit must
be brought within a specified time "from the date of the act or
omission complained of."16 For certain tort actions involving injuries to the person or to real and personal property, Connecticut
has established two limitation periods: "within one year from the
date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered," and
"except that no such action may be brought more than three years
from the date of the act or omission complained of." 17 Most of these
statutory standards are relatively flexible, thus allowing the courts
substantial discretion in deciding when the requisite circumstances
existed which gave rise to a claim as a matter of substantive law.18
The Missouri legislature, however, has prescribed definite criteria
for determining the date of accrual: "[T]he cause of action shall not
be deemed to accrue when the wrong is done or the technical
breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage resulting
therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment, and, if more
than one item of damage, then the last item, so that all resulting
damage may be recovered, and full and complete relief obtained."19
Despite the apparent uniformity in statutory language, judicial
construction of limitations statutes has resulted in a variety of
approaches for selecting the point of time from which the period
should be measured. Although the approaches are sometimes difficult to categorize, the subsequent discussion analyzes two principal lines of authority which are further divided into variations on
each approach.20 The majority of decisions designate the time
E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 312; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.01 (1947).
ch. 95, § 11 (1960); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 330.19 (1958).
14 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (1953).
15 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8118 (Supp. 1962); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3537 (West
1953).
16 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577 (1960).
17 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (1960).
18 See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitation, 63 liARv. L. REv. 1177, 1200
(1950).
19 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.100 (1949).
20 Compare McNeal, Bloom, Christovich, Cope, Cull, & Dejarnette, The Statute of
12

13 FLA. STAT. ANN.
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when the negligence or wrong occurred as the point of accrual of
a cause of action. On the other hand, there appears to be a growing
body of authority which measures the limitation period from the
date on which the plaintiff had notice of his injury, or, in at least
two cases, from the time the causal connection was ascertained by
the injured party.

I. At the Time of Negligence or Wrong
In any action brought to recover damages caused by the tortious conduct of the defendant, the claimant must allege and prove
that some legally protected interest has been invaded and, in
order to recover more than nominal damages, that he has incurred
an actual loss.21 Therefore, it seems illogical to say that the statute
of limitations started running prior to a legally compensable invasion of a protected interest, because it would be impossible to
sustain an action without that essential element. This, however~
is precisely the result which at least two courts have reached.22 In
both cases the defendants' wrongful conduct had occurred some
years prior to the actual effect upon the plaintiffs. In one of the
decisions, the anomalous result can be attributed to the selection by
the Connecticut legislature of the language, "from the date of the
act or omission complained of."23 But the statute involved in the
other decision employed the typical language of accrual; moreover, the court specifically recognized that the plaintiff could not
have maintained an action before he had suffered an injury to his
property caused by defendant's negligence.24 Nevertheless, the
court declared that recovery could not be permitted for negligent
conduct occurring at an earlier date not within the statutory
period, even though suit was brought shortly after the injurious
Limitations Problem in Relation to Atomic Energy Liability, 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 347, 349
(1959), where five possible points of time are mentioned with respect to when the limitation
period could start running.
21 For example, in a suit based on negligent conduct of the defendant. PROSSER,
TORTS 165 (2d ed. 1955).
22 Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1952) (applying a Connecticut
statute); Hooper v. Carr Lumber Co., 215 N.C. 308, l S.E.2d 818 (1939). See also Powers
v. Planters Nat'l Bank &: Trust Co., 219 N.C. 254, 13 S.E.2d 431 (1941).
23 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577 (1960) (formerly § 8324). The Connecticut Supreme
Court avoided a literal application of the statute in a case involving facts similar to those
in Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co. by construing the plaintiff's claim as one for failure
to warn "that the defendant, although knowing that the cartridge, if defective, would be
an inherently dangerous article and a source of unreasonable risk of injury to those who
might use it, permitted it to be available for future use without indicating by label or
otherwise the danger to which the user would expose himself." Thus, defendant's course
of conduct continued to the time of injury, at which time the statute began to run. Handler
v. Remington Arms Co., 144 Conn. 316, 321, 130 A.2d 793, 795 (1957).
24 Hooper v. Carr Lumber Co., 215 N.C. 308, 311, 1 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1939).
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impact on plaintiff's property. Although it is unreasonable to hold
that a claim can be barred by a limitation before the cause of action
arises, these two decisions indicate that the defense may be successful when the wrongful conduct precedes the injury by a substantial
period of time.
Obviously, such authority would be applicable in a radiation
incident, especially if there were a significant time lapse between
the negligent release of radioactive material and the actual exposure of the persons or property of those ultimately harmed. F:or
example, disposal of waste products in a river, or even in a large
lake or an ocean, might eventually contaminate the land of riparian owners or fish which are caught and sold. The wrongful conduct was the improper disposal and, applying the above analysis,
the statute would begin to run from that time. However, the better
reasoned decisions involving analogous circumstances have rejected that argument and have designated the time when the conduct resulted in injury to the plaintiff as the point from which the
limitation statute began to run.25 Even if the more reasonable
approach were taken in these circumstances, the principal characteristic of radiation injuries which creates significant problems in
avoiding an unreasonable limitations bar is the substantial delay
between actual exposure and manifestation of the physical effects.
Usually a defendant's wrongful act and the resulting injury to
a plaintiff's person or property are contemporaneous. Factual
situations are not uncommon, however, in which the plaintiff is
without notice of any wrongful conduct or any harm that he has
suffered, although there may have been an invasion of his legally
protected interests which has the potential for causing significant
injury with the passage of time. Illustratively, a variety of items,
including surgical sponges, rubber tubes, forceps, and broken
needles, have been left in incisions following operations. The
patient seldom realizes it until the foreign body reaction has manifested itself to such an extent that subsequent surgery is required
and the object is found during the later operation.26 Not infrequently the courts have held that the patient's action accrued at
the moment the defendant allegedly committed his act constituting
the malpractice, thereby barring the claim without a real opportunity for the plaintiff to obtain relief.27 In addition, numerous cases
25 See, e.g., White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941); Foley v. PittsburghDes Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).
26 See, e.g., Capucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1929) (sponge); Thatcher
v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943) (surgical needle).
27 E.g., Graham v. Updegraph, 144 Kan. 45, 58 P.2d 475 (1936) (cause of action accrued
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involving latent injuries caused by exposure to deleterious substances have raised the limitation issue, and the courts have often
sustained the position that the injury occurred when there was a
wrongful invasion of personal or property rights, for at that moment liability for the wrongful exposure arose.28
One further illustration of a plaintiff without notice of his
cause of action involves the situation where faulty workmanship
results in the early deterioration of a structure, the consequential
damage being the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful
conduct. It has been held that the legal wrong occurred at the time
the work was performed, and the damages subsequently discovered
merely enhanced the loss resulting from that wrong. 29
The three situations just described, and undoubtedly numerous others, are clearly analogous to the circumstances which will
arise in radiation incidents. Because such cases will likely provide
the judicial precedent for the interpretation of existing limitation
statutes as applied to delayed manifestation radiation injuries, it
becomes imperative to understand the courts' analysis in deciding
when a cause of action accrued.
In Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co.,30 the New
York Court of Appeals articulated the rationale for starting the
limitation period at that point of time when the facts first exist
which would permit the plaintiff to succeed in an action against
the defendant. At the moment of a wrongful invasion of personal
or property rights a cause of action accrues, even though the injured party may be unaware of the existence of the wrong or injury.31 Moreover, although "consequential damages may flow from
an injury too slight to be noticed at the time it is inflicted," a new
cause of action does not arise when such consequential damages
are manifested. 32 With respect to the amount of the recovery in an
action brought shortly after the right accrues, the court suggested
when defendant failed to remove some of the radium beads used for cancer therapy on
the specified date for termination of the treatment); Coady v. Reins, 1 Mont. 424 (1872)
(statute commenced to run the day defendant unskillfully set and treated plaintiff's
fractured and dislocated arm). See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368 (1961).

28 E.g., Zimmerer v. General Elec. Co., 126 F. Supp. 690 (D. Conn. 1954); Schmidt v.
Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936); Grant v. Fisher
Flouring Mills Co., 181 Wash. 576, 44 P.2d 193 (1935).
29 Kennedy v. Johns-Manv~Ile Sales Corp., 135 Conn. 176, 62 A.2d 771 (1948); cf.
White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941), where an action for the negligent
installation of a lightning rod was held not to be barred, because the mere possibility
of injury would not have been sufficient to impose liability when the rod was installed.
30 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936).
31 Id. at 300, 200 N.E. at 827.
32 Ibid.; accord, Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 162 N.W. 217 (1917).
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that "so far as such consequential damages may be reasonably anticipated, they may be included in a recovery for the original injury,
though even at the time of the trial they may not yet exist." 83 No
mention is made, however, of consequential damages which could
not be "reasonably anticipated," and presumably there could be
no recovery for such damages.
If suit were brought at an early date when the potential loss
is too uncertain to meet the standard for recovery, res judicata
would preclude a second action when consequential damages are
subsequently ascertained. 34 On the other hand, if the injured party
awaits development of the consequential damages before bringing
an action, his remedy will probably be barred by the statute of
limitations. In order to avoid the limitations bar in this latter
situation, the injured party must prove that at the time of impact
the potentiality of future damage was so indefinite that full prospective damages were not recoverable, and, therefore, the statute
should not run prior to maturation of substantial harm. 315 But this
places the onerous burden on the plaintiff of proving that damages
which have actually developed could not have been "reasonably
anticipated" at the time of the initial injury. Adding to the dilemma of the plaintiff is the fact that often he has no notice of either
the wrongful conduct or the slight harm he has immediately sustained, which makes it virtually impossible to obtain judicial relief in many of the cases involving latent injuries.
In a recent decision the New York Court of Appeals applied
the Schmidt analysis in a suit for radiation-induced injuries.86 A
product sold by the defendant had been injected into plaintiff's
sinuses for the purpose of making them perceptible in X-rays.
Part of the substance, which was allegedly radioactive, remained
in plaintiff's head and produced a carcinoma resulting in the loss
of an eye fourteen years after the injection. The New York limitation period for claims based on negligence is three years. 87 The
action was brought within two years after the eye was removed
33 Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 300-01, 200 N.E. 824,
827 (1936). See ATOMS AND THE LAw 262 for a discussion of the standard of proof required
to prove future injury. See also Annot., 85 A.L.R. 1010 (1933), regarding standards with
respect to future pain and suffering.
84 The doctrine of merger would foreclose a second suit if plaintiff had obtained
judgment in the first action, and if the defendant had been successful in the earlier
suit he could plead the judgment in bar. See BLUME, AMERICAN CML PROCEDURE 354-55
(1955).
85 See Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1206.
86 Schwartz v. Hayden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y .2d 212, 190 N.E.2d 253, 237
N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963).
87 N.Y. Crv. PRAc. Ac:r § 214(6).
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and the plaintiff learned the supposed cause of his injury. Although recognizing that an action accrues only when there has
been actual harm to the plaintiff, the court adopted the view expressed in Schmidt and assumed that the radioactive substance
acted immediately upon the plaintiff's internal tissue. Thus, even
though some actual deterioration of a plaintiff's bodily structure
must occur before the statute begins to run, the immediate ionizing effect when human tissue is exposed to radioactive material38
apparently will satisfy this requirement. A person who has unknowingly been exposed to nuclear radiation is therefore precluded from recovering for any serious physical effects which
develop, since his action will be barred under the usual interpretation of limitations statutes.
The fact that plaintiff received notice of a slight injury, although he lacked knowledge of the full potential harm, has been
a significant factor in certain cases. 89 Illustratively, in two actions
brought in Florida each plaintiff suffered injuries which had developed from allegedly negligent X-ray treatment. In one, plaintiff
experienced no burns or other reaction immediately, but developed
sores several years later; 40 the other claimant suffered slight burns
and an erythema reaction at the time of treatment, resulting in a
cancerous condition some years subsequent.41 In the former suit
the statute of limitations was held not to start running until plaintiff had notice of her injury, i.e., when the sores developed. The
latter action, however, was barred because the limitation period
was calculated from the date of defendant's negligence, since the
plaintiff was put on notice of the invasion of a legal right. If a person were informed that he had been negligently exposed to a certain level of radiation, without experiencing immediate ill effects,
would this be sufficient notice for his cause of action to accrue?
Assuming that it would, he is then faced with the burden of proving consequential damages which are "reasonably anticipated," or
possibly awaiting the development of actual injury which may
occur at a time when his remedy is foreclosed by a limitations
period.
To avoid the harsh result of just claims being barred, some
courts have developed a theory of continuing negligence. When a
series of breaches occurs or a particular relationship continues
which existed when the ·wrongful act was committed, these courts
88 See ATOMS AND TIIE LAw 10-35.
80 E.g., Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 162 N.W. 217 (1917).
40 City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954).
41 Buck v. Mouradian, 100 So. 2d 70 (Fla. App. 1958).
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hold that the limitation period starts on the date of the last breach
in the series or at the termination of the relationship.42 The relationship theory has been used frequently in circumstances where,
because of improper working conditions,43 an employee incurred
a lung disease from the inhalation of dust, fumes, or other deleterious substance for an extended time, or where a physician's omission or neglect resulted in a latent injury, but the doctor-patient
relationship continued for some time after the specific act of malpractice.44 The continuing tort theory has been employed successfully in litigation not involving employment or the doctor-patient
relationship. Cases have arisen in which people residing in the
vicinity of industrial plants have suffered latent personal injury,
and sometimes property damage, as the result of chronic exposure
to dusts or toxic elements negligently emitted by the plants. Soine
courts have placed the beginning of the limitation period at the
date of last exposure in order to save plaintiffs' remedy from the
statutory bar.45 Clearly, such authority will be applicable to some
suits for recovery of damages caused by chronic exposure to radiation-for example, the continual discharge of radioactive dust
particles over a residential area from a nuclear power plant in
which the safety devices have become defective. Application of
this doctrine, however, may depend upon the manner in which
the complaint is framed, because under these cases the defendant's
wrongful conduct must continue during the entire period of exposure or throughout the relationship. 46
Attempts to utilize the continuing tort theory have been made
in cases where there was neither a continuous exposure nor a continuing relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. Confronted with a limitations bar if an action were based on the
defendant's original negligent act, a few claimants suffering from
latent injuries have alleged that the defendant had a continuing
42
43

See Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 277, 289 (1950).
E.g., Rowe v. Gatl<e Corp., 126 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1942); Plazak v. Allegheny Steel,

324 Pa. 422, 188 Atl. 130 (1936); Tennessee Eastman Corp. v. Newman, 22 Tenn. App.
270, 121 S.W.2d 130 (1938). Contra, Columbus Mining Co. v. Walker, 271 S.W.2d 276
(Ky. 1954).
44 E.g., Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943); Gillette v. Tucker,
67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
45 Reynolds Metals v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1958); Berry v. Franklin Plate
Glass Corp., 66 F. Supp. 863 (W.D. Pa. 1946), affd, 161 F.2d 184 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 767 (1947).
· 46 For instance, a claim for malpractice might charge the defendant with permitting
a foreign object to remain in plaintiff's body after an operation and negligently failing
to discover the object during the remaining period of treatment. See Thatcher v. De Tar,
351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943).
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duty to warn persons who had been exposed to the deleterious
substance in defendant's product.47 However, these attempts have
thus far been unsuccessful, although at least one court recognized
some merit in the idea of creating a new common-law tort based
on a continuing duty of a manufacturer to warn the public of
harmful effects or need for treatment after exposure to damaging
substances, once the manufacturer has some reason to believe that
such exposure has occurred.48 This idea could readily be applied to
a radiation incident, and a court might be willing to save a plaintiff's claim by imposing a duty on those who use radioactive materials to warn the public or specific individuals of possible damaging exposures. In this way one whose radiation injury was induced
by a single exposure might also be able to invoke the continuing
tort doctrine.
A variation of the theory of continuing negligence was applied
in Wright v. Carter Prods. 49 where plaintiff contracted dermatitis
caused by a chemical compound used in a deodorant manufactured
by defendant. Plaintiff had applied the product two or three times
a week for five years, but then developed a slight rash. She discontinued its use for five months, and the rash subsided; subsequently,
a severe allergic reaction developed after only two applications.
Suit was filed within the limitation period, if the period were
calculated from the date of the last application. The court held
that if the trier of fact should find that plaintiff's affliction was
proximately caused by the last application, then her claim accrued
at that time.r;o Thus, where an injury is the result of a series of
exposures having a cumulative effect, the last few, or indeed the
last exposure itself, may have been a necessary element in the
causation of the ultimate damage. If plaintiff would have incurred
no injury without the final contact or exposure, then clearly under the theory of this case, the limitation should not start before
that time. On the other hand, the earlier exposures will usually
have contributed to the total damage, and it frequently would be
impossible to prove the precise exposure which made some injury
certain to occur and without which no harm would have resulted. ·
Therefore, the continuing tort theory alleviates a substantial proof
problem in many factual situations.
-t1 E.g., Zimmerer v. General Elec. Co., 126 F. Supp. 690 (D. Conn. 1954); Schwartz v.
Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 190 N.E.2d 253, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963).
-ts Zimmerer v. General Elec. Co., supra note 47, at 693.
-to 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957).
ISO Id. at 63.
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Because of the cumulative effect of exposure to radiation,51
special problems may arise in those cases in which a plaintiff has
been exposed a number of times. Four possible situations may
occur: first, more than one person may have exposed the plaintiff,
but all the exposures were needed for any injury to result; second,
again having multiple defendants, each exposure was sufficient to
cause some injury, and thus each defendant is merely a contributing tortfeasor; third, one person may have caused all the exposures,
and the sum of the exposures was required to produce an injury;
and, fourth, the single defendant may have exposed plaintiff each
time to injury-inducing quantities of radiation. The latter two
situations could be handled under the traditional continuing tort
theory. However, the existence of multiple defendants will present
novel questions in attempting to utilize the doctrine, and it seems
unlikely that it would be applied in such circumstances. Certainly,
both the first and second situations create additional problems in
working out the substantive liability of each defendant if the
limitation issue were to be settled in favor of the plaintiff. 52

2. At the Time of Notice of Injury
A significant trend in the judicial interpretation of limitations
statutes appears to be developing in cases involving delayed manifestation diseases or injuries caused by wrongful conduct which
was unknown to the plaintiff at the time of the technical invasion
of his legal interests. In order to save meritorious claims from the
statutory bar, courts have frequently been forced to formulate new
theories and reasons to justify placing the start of the limitation
period at some date subsequent to the time that plaintiff would
probably have been able to sustain a cause of action (had he
known of its existence). The underlying rationale which supports
this rather recent development is that a person must have some
notice of his cause of action, an awareness either that he has suffered an injury or that another person has committed a legal wrong
which ultimately may result in harm to him, before the statute
can begin to run.
The major impetus in this development came from the decision in Urie v. Thompson, 53 wherein the Supreme Court held that
the plaintiff's cause of action accrued when the injurious conseSee ATOMS AND THE LAW 23.
For a detailed discussion of the general problem of multiple defendants in radiation cases, see ATOMS AND THE LAw 361-421.
53 337 U.S. 163 (1949). See generally Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 277 (1950).
51
52
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quences of defendant's negligence became manifest. After working
thirty years for the defendant railroad, in 1940 plaintiff became
disabled from silicosis, a pulmonary disease caused by the prolonged inhalation of silica dust. Suit was filed in 1941, and the
defendant pleaded the three-year limitation.54 Defendant proposed
two alternative theories as to when the cause of action accrued:
first, that Urie must have unwittingly contracted silicosis long
before 1938, thus not within the limitation period before suit was
filed; or, second, that each inhalation of silica dust was a separate
tort, therefore recovery should be limited to the consequential
damages resulting from inhalations between 1938 and 1940, when
he stopped working. But the Court flatly rejected "such a mechanical analysis of the 'accrual' of petitioner's injury." 55 However, the
Court avoided applying the theory of continuing negligence which
would have accomplished the same favorable result for Urie. Of
particular significance is the Court's reference to "the traditional
purposes of statutes of limitations, which conventionally require
the assertion of claims within a specified period of time after notice
of the invasion of legal rights." 56 The opinion emphasized the
humane legislative plan upon which plaintiff's claim was based57
and that defendant's theories would thwart the congressional purpose. Furthermore, the Court quoted language from a California
workmen's compensation case58 as authority for holding that the
limitation period begins when the disease manifests itself. Clearly
these two factors, the congressional plan for the protection of railroad employees, and the fact that a workmen's compensation decision was cited as authority, could make Urie v. Thompson distinguishable from a case involving a common-law tort claim or
one in which an employment or confidential relationship was
lacking.
On the other hand, the principle that plaintiff must receive
some notice of his cause of action before the statute of limitations
starts running has been applied in the context of a common-law
tort claim.59 Moreover, several courts have considered workmen's
114 Plaintiff's claim was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which
provides that an action shall be barred three years after it accrues. 35 Stat. 66 (1908), as
amended, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1954).
1111 337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949).
ISfl Id. at 170. (Emphasis added.)
117 Both the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 51-60 (1958), and the Boiler Inspection Act, 36 Stat. 913 (1911), as amended, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 22-34 (1958), were involved in the present action.
118 Associated Indem. Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 124 Cal. App. 378, 12 P .2d
1075 (1932).
ISO See, e.g., City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306, 309 (Fla. 1954).
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compensation cases as applicable authority in interpreting limitations provisions governing nonstatutory claims. 60 In workmen's
compensation cases courts frequently justify a liberal interpretation of accrual language because they feel that such statutes involve
a "humane legislative scheme," 61 or in many instances because the
statute creates a particular relationship which places a special duty
on the defendant for plaintiff's protection.62 Often, compensation
cases, such as Urie v. Thompson, are cited when courts resolve
general tort litigation in which neither of these arguments is
present. Considerations of fairness may also play an important
role in the construction of limitations statutes. Admittedly, these
statutes are supported by a strong public policy in favor of repose
and fairness to potential defendants, but the countervailing consideration of justice for plaintiffs who are blamelessly ignorant of
their claims may overcome this policy. 63 Courts often refer to the
unreasonable, even absurd, result of holding that an action is
barred before the plaintiff knew of his injury, or place emphasis on
the fact that the right to recover for many serious but slowly
developing diseases would be nullified if the statute ran before
there was notice to the injured party of his claim. 64 One additional
reason which has been given for delaying the start of the limitation
period is that the injurious consequences suffered by plaintiff were
the product "of a period of time rather than a point of time," and,
therefore, the afflicted party can be held to be injured only when
the accumulated effects manifest themselves. 65
Although the underlying rationale of the theory under discussion is that the element of notice to the plaintiff is essential to the
accrual of a cause of action, the decisions vary as to what constitutes
sufficient notice. Four possibilities are suggested by the language
of the opinions. One idea, frequently appearing, is that the damages or injury must be susceptible of ascertainment. 66 It would
60 See, e.g., Sylvania Elec. Prods. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955) (applying
Nebraska law); Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936).
61 See, e.g., Hutchison v. Semler, 227 Ore. 437, 361 P.2d 803 (1961).
62 See, e.g., Brush Beryllium Co. v. Meckley, 284 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1960) (applying
Ohio law); City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954).
63 See Fernandi v. Stmlly, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961).
64 See, e.g., Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1960) (applying
Connecticut law); Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959).
65 The quoted phrase originally appeared in Associated Indem. Corp. v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 124 Cal. App. 378, 381, 12 P.2d 1075, 1076 (1932). See Urie v. Thompson,
337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949); Brush Beryllium Co. v. Meckley, 284 F.2d 797, 800 (1960); United
States v. Reid, 251 F.2d 691, 695 (5th Cir. 1958).
66 See, e.g., Gahimer v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 241 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1957);
Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959).
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seem that this is basically the approach taken in Urie v. Thompson,
the idea being expressed there in terms of manifestation of the
harmful effects of defendant'_s wrongful act. The connotation of
manifestation is that the injury is ascertainable by observation or
by some other means of human perception. Of course, there are
varying degrees of manifestation, and the decisions do not discuss
the problem of whether a disease, for example, is "ascertainable"
when symptoms first appear or only after it can clearly be diagnosed as a particular disease.
A second possibility as to when notice is sufficient is the moment that plaintiff actually discovers or knows that he has a
particular disease or injury. 67 Indeed, it has frequently been held
that the limitation period did not commence until the plaintiff's
illness was actually diagnosed by a physician. 68 Although this standard of notice can be easily determined, it is susceptible to abuse
by a plaintiff who is aware of symptoms foretelling his serious
condition but who delays confirmation of his apprehension that he
is suffering from a fatal disease.
The third possible date when the action will accrue is usually
mentioned as an alternative to the time when plaintiff knew of his
injury or disease. This is when he should have known. 69 This idea
may also be phrased so as specifically to require reasonable diligence on the part of the plaintiff to discover the nature of his illness.70 By permitting use of this alternative to actual knowledge of
the plaintiff, courts preserve the inherent fairness of the concept of
notice of a cause of action as a condition for accrual.
As a fourth possibility for when the notice is sufficient, there
is language in two California malpractice cases which suggests that
the limitations statute may not start to run until plaintiff knows
the specific cause of his disability. 71 In both cases, however, the
doctor-patient relationship continued long enough to support the
decisions solely on the basis of a continuing negligence theory.
67 See, e.g., McGhee v. Chesapeake &: O.R.R., 173 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Mich. 1959); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Ford, 92 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1956).
68 Young v. Clinchfield R.R., 288 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1961); Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes,
Inc., 277 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1960); Sylvania Elec. Prods. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir.
1955); Bradt v. United States, 221 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1955); Muse v. Freeman, 197 F. Supp.
67 (E.D. Va. 1961).
oo See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Ford, 92 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1956); Hutchison v.
Semler, 227 Ore. 437, 361 P.2d 803 (1961).
70 See Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1960); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Alexander, 291 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
71 See Hundley v. St. Francis Hosp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 800, 327 P.2d 131 (1958); Trombley v. Kolts, 29 Cal. App. 2d 699, 85 P.2d 541 (1938).
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Nevertheless, in each opinion the holding was at least partially
supported by the idea that notice of causal connection is a prerequisite for commencing the limitation period. Moreover, decisions involving workmen's compensation claims which suggest that
notice of the cause of plaintiff's injury is a condition of accrual72
could provide analogous authority in a common-law tort claim. 78
Even though courts have gone quite far to relieve innocent
plaintiffs who were victims of slow-developing diseases, or delayed
manifestation injuries, from the harsh result of a statutory bar, the
problem of what will constitute sufficient notice of a cause of action
remains unsettled. Of particular importance is the question of
whether notice to a person that he was negligently exposed to
radiation will immediately give rise to a cause of action. He has
technically suffered an "injury" which, presumably, would entitle
him to at least a nominal recovery. But unless future injury were
"reasonably certain" to occur74 and such anticipated loss could be
substantiated, the plaintiff would remain uncompensated for the
actual serious damage which might develop subsequently. On the
other hand, if limitations statutes were construed so as to commence running only after the plaintiff has notice of his ultimate
injury (even though he knew of the exposure), perhaps twenty or
thirty years after exposure, potential defendants are placed at a
considerable disadvantage. The plaintiff, knowing that he has been
exposed to a specified dose of radiation by the defendant, can preserve his evidence, await development of any serious consequences
and then spring his claim on the defendant who will obviously be
hard-pressed to defend adequately against a suit. Not only is there
a danger of spurious claims being brought under these circumstances, but the fact that radiation-induced injuries are nonspecific
also creates the distinct possibility of recoveries for injuries which
were not caused by the defendant. 75 The obvious inequities cast
upon either plaintiffs or defendants, depending upon which concept of notice is adopted, suggest the stark inadequacy of existing
principles of interpretation of the accrual of a cause of action.
72 See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Porter, 192 Md. 494, 64 A.2d 715 (1948); Whitehead v. Holston Defense Corp., 205 Tenn. 326, 326 S.W.2d 482 (1959).
73 The First Circuit looked to Nebraska workmen's compensation cases to decide how
the Nebraska courts would construe a limitation in a common•law tort action. Sylvania
Elec. Prods. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955). But cf. Repass v. Keleket X-ray Corp.,
212 F. Supp. 406 (D.N.J. 1962).
74 For a detailed discussion of problems of proving future damages, see ATOMS AND
TIIE LAw 465-94. See also Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New
Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REv. 259, 275 (1960).
75 See Estep, supra note 74, at 268.
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The problems are perhaps more complex and thus more likely
to defy equitable solution when the radiation victim receives no
immediate notice of the exposure. If he develops, for example,
sterility, cancer, or leukemia several years hence, would this be
notice that he had been exposed to radiation at an earlier date,
and by whom? These are not difficulties raised solely by limitation provisions, but at least in part by the nature of the injuries.
Providing that a plaintiff could meet minimal proof standards as
to a particular defendant's liability for his injuries, it would appear
that some courts would hold that the cause of action did not accrue
until plaintiff at least knew, or should have known, of his injury,
and even perhaps not until he knew its causal connection with
defendant's radiation source. Even this could be known only in a
statistical sense because each of these diseases occurs in a certain
percent of the population without any known cause and certainly
without exposure to more than background radiation. Therefore,
it does not seem unlikely that a court which is not bound to follow
the notice theory of accrual might consider the difficult proof problems that it would be required to resolve and avoid such problems
by holding the action barred by the statute of limitations.
B. Suspension of the Limitation Period

Apart from considerations of whether or not a cause of action
has accrued, other circumstances may prevent commencement of
litigation despite the existence of a cognizable claim.76 Legislatures
and courts have recognized certain conditions as grounds for postponement of the start of the limitation period or interruption of
the running of the sta~ute. These conditions are categorized in
terms of plaintiff's incapacity to bring an action, conduct of defendant which hinders suit, and special circumstances in which an
action has failed or is otherwise prevented. Many of the tolling
provisions are common throughout the country with only slight
variations from state to state, while other enactments are peculiar
to one or two jurisdictions.
1. Plaintiff's Incapacity

Legal disabilities such as infancy, insanity, and imprisonment
are generally recognized in limitation statutes as bases for postponement. The legislative provisions may include claimants hav76 See generally Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63
1177, 1220-37 (1950).
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ing "any legal disability" 77 or specify particular disabilities to be
protected. 78 Frequently a maximum period is set for which the
limitation can be tolled,7 9 or, on the other hand, a single limitation period may be applicable, regardless of the type of claim,
after the disability is removed. 80 Otherwise, the statute will be
tolled throughout the period of disability and the limitation normally governing the particular cause involved will start running
when the plaintiff acquires the capacity to sue. In Delaware and
Pennsylvania, however, limitations applicable to personal injury
actions are not affected by disabilities. 81 One further qualification,
generally recognized, is that the plaintiff's infirmity must exist
when the cause of action accrues and will not suspend the statute
once it has commenced running. 82
Although the above-mentioned tolling provision will not be
generally significant in coping with the special problems arising
in radiation cases, it could be utilized advantageously in particular
circumstances. If recovery were to be allowed to children, deformed as a consequence of the genetic damage suffered by a
parent who had been irradiated, 83 the cause of action might be
tolled during his minority, providing no special limitation statute
is enacted to accommodate such new principles of liability. Moreover, radiation injuries suffered by a viable foetus might not become manifest during early childhood, and this particular tolling
statute would be especially relevant. Obviously, any person who is
under a legal disability at the time of exposure may benefit from
the additional time allowed by a suspension of the usual limitation period. There are other circumstances concerning a plaintiff's
capacity to sue which are commonly recognized as grounds for
tolling a limitation, but they have no particular relevance to radiation injuries. 84
77 E.g.,
78 E.g.,

KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-307 (1949).
ARIZ. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 12-502 (1956).
79 E.g., MONT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. § 93-2703 (1947) (cannot extend period more than five
years except for infancy).
so E.g., N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 508:8 (1955) (within two years after the disability is
removed).
81 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8115 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 35 (1953) (as construed in Peterson v. Delaware River Ferry Co., 190 Pa. 364, 42 Atl. 955 (1899)).
82 See Developments in the Law, supra note 76, at 1229.
83 See Estep & Forgotson, Legal Liability for Genetic Injuries From Radiation, 24 LA.
L. REv. 1 (1963).
84 State legislatures have generally provided for the suspension of limitations statutes
during the interim between the claimholder's death and the appointment of a personal
representative, if decedent's action was not already barred. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 3-803
(1935). An extension may be granted if death occurred within thirty days after the expiration of the limitation period. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.610 (1935). Usually the rep•
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2. Defendant's Conduct
Perhaps the most common tolling provision in existence today
is that which excludes from the limitation period the time that
defendant is absent from the state in which plaintiff resides. Typically, if the defendant is absent when the cause accrues, the statute
of limitations will not begin running until he returns; also, the
limitation is tolled if the defendant departs after the claim arises,
although a specified minimum period of absence may be required. 85 About one-fourth of the states suspend the period only
when the defendant leaves to take up residence in another jurisdiction. 86 Moreover, application of the tolling statute in a particular
state may be circumscribed by certain limitations-that the plaintiff be a resident,87 that the cause have arisen within the state, 88 or
that suit be brought within a maximum tolling period. 89 Obviously,
the policy underlying this tolling provision is to protect the plaintiff who is unable to obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
Therefore, it seems illogical to regard the defendant as "absent" if
a means of substituted service is available.
Although the source of injurious radiation frequently will be
stationary and thus usually affect only persons in the vicinity of
defendant's nuclear operations, in a significant number of cases
persons and property outside the state of defendant's place of business or incorporation might be irradiated. Illustratively, an accident during shipment of radioactive materials or the improper
disposal of waste products affecting land several miles downstream
could create a cause of action in another state where the injurious
impact occurred. Therefore, unless the defendant acquired sufficient contacts so as not to be "absent" from the state where injury
occurred, the limitation apparently would be tolled, and an injured party would be able to assert his claim several years after the
statute would otherwise have run. However, to take advantage
of the tolling provision, suit usually would have to be filed in the
resentative must bring the action within one year after death, assuming that the statute
of limitations otherwise applicable to decedent's claim would have run before that time.
E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 20 (Smith-Hurd 1962). If the cause of action accrues after
the plaintiff's death, the start of the limitation period is generally held to be postponed
until a representative is appointed. See Developments in the Law, supra note 76, at 1233.
For a decision holding that decedent's claim for personal injury did not arise until after
death, sec McGhec v. Chesapeake 8e O.R.R., 173 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Mich. 1959).
85 Sec Developments in the Law, supra note 76, at 1224-25.
86 E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.200 (1949).
87 E.g., R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-1-18 (1956).
88 E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 40 (1953).
so E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-590 (1960) (seven years).
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state where the action arose,90 and plaintiff might not be able to
acquire jurisdiction over the absent defendant. Thus, such a tolling provision may have only a limited effect on statutes of limitations in radiation cases. State legislatures also have enacted provisions to suspend the limitation period upon a defendant's demise,
usually extending the time for bringing suit to one year after the
appointment of a representative.91 But this will have little relevance in radiation incidents, assuming that the potential defendant
usually will be a corporation. A claim against a dissolved and liquidated corporation would have little, if any, value. 92
Although statutes of limitations are some evidence of a legislative judgment as to the capability of courts to decide old claims,
their primary purpose is the protection of defendants from the
harassment and surprise of having to defend against stale claims.
Consequently, the statute of limitations is usually regarded as a
personal defense and frequently must be specifically pleaded by
the defendant. 93 If the defendant has promised not to plead the
statute, courts will enforce the agreement in most circumstances
under usual contract principles. However, a waiver may be unenforceable if it was made before, rather than after, liability arose
or if it is of indefinite duration rather than for a definite period
of time. 94 In addition, even though defendant's conduct does not
constitute a waiver, i.e., acts only resembling a promise, it may
be sufficient for the application of principles of estoppel.95 Where
defendant's fraud or misrepresentations have induced plaintiff to
forbear prosecution of a known claim, and the limitation period
expired during the period of forbearance, the defendant generally
is estopped from relying on the statutory bar.96 Moreover, courts
may employ an equitable estoppel to defeat the statutory bar in
90 Since limitation provisions are generally characterized as procedural in the conflict
of laws, a forum would apply its own tolling statute; therefore, in any state in which
defendant had resided during the limitation period the action would be barred, See
part D infra.
·
91 E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.310 (1960). However, Hawaii has expressly provided that
the defendant's death does not interrupt the running of the statute of limitations.
HAWAII REv. LAws § 241-16 (1955). In a few other states no provision to postpone the
statutory bar in this situation has been included among the other tolling sections. E.g.,
Colorado, Kansas, and Ohio.
92 See LATIIN, CORPORATIONS ch. 12, § 11 (1959).
93 E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
94 See Developments in the Law, supra note 76, at 1223-24.
95 See generally Dawson, Estoppel and Statutes of Limitation, 34 MICH. L. REV. I (1935).
96 E.g., Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959), 12 W. REs. L. REV.
122 (1960). Although Glus was an FELA case, there is usually an exception to the general
rule where the limitation is "substantive," i.e., enacted in conjunction with a statute
creating a cause of action. Id. at 123.
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circumstances involving plaintiff's reasonable reliance on any conduct of a misleading nature.97
If a major nuclear incident were to occur, the responsible party
might be willing to promise to waive the defense of a limitation
bar in consideration for promises from those who were exposed
that they would not file suit until a radiation-induced injury manifested itself. 98 The inducement on defendant's part would be the
avoidance of having to defend immediately a large number of
cases and the certain prospect of a few high recoveries for speculative damages which juries are likely to award. On the other
hand, the potential plaintiffs would have a strong motive to enter
such an agreement because of the substantial proof problems they
must face in trying to establish future injuries which are "reasonably certain" to develop.99 Furthermore, assuming that extensive
settlement negotiations would arise out of an incident of any magnitude, plaintiffs might succeed in estopping a plea of limitations
if defendant's conduct during such negotiations was of a character
that misled plaintiffs.
Defendant's fraudulent concealment of the existence of a cause
of action is commonly recognized by both the judiciary and legislatures as a justifiable basis for postponement of the limitation
period. 100 Whether the rationale is expressed in terms of defendant's conduct estopping him from pleading the statute, the acts of
fraudulent concealment constituting a basis for tolling the limitation, or defendant's activity amounting to a fraud which gives
rise to an independent cause of action, the same result will be
achieved, because the damage in a suit for fraud presumably would
be the value of the claim that was barred. The principal problems
facing the courts are what conduct constitutes fraudulent concealment and what facts must be concealed in order to invoke this
exception.
Generally, the acts of concealment must comprise active misrepresentation or conduct rather than silence or inaction, unless
97 E.g., Hayes v. Gessner, 1115 Mass. 366, 52 N.E.2d 968 (1944) (assurances that the
claim would be satisfied without suit); McLeam v. Hill, 276 Mass. 519, 177 N.E. 617
(1931) (request by defendant that plaintiff delay filing a complaint).
llS However, if such an agreement would not be enforceable because it was of an
indefinite duration (see text accompanying note 94 supra), the parties could set a maximum period of twenty-five or thirty years during which defendant would not plead the
statute as a defense to an action arising out of this particular incident.
oo See authorities cited note 74 supra.
100 See, e.g., Mn. ANN. CODE art. 57, § 14 (1957); Perrin v. Rodriguez, 153 So. 555
(La. App. 1934). See generally Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MICH. L. REv. 875 (1933).
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there exists a relationship of a fiduciary nature or a statutory duty
to disclose. 101 Whether defendant intended to conceal or merely
made innocent misrepresentations should not be determinative,
since the effect on plaintiff's claim will be the same in either situation. Moreover, where a confidential relationship exists, as between doctor and patient, a duty affirmatively to disclose wrongful
conduct is frequently implied where defendant allegedly knew of
the negligent act,1°2 and occasionally has been imposed where he
did not know. 103 In addition, it has been held that a defendant
who voluntarily undertook to treat the plaintiff for injuries suffered as a result of its negligence, had a duty placed upon it to
disclose fully the extent of his injuries and the probable future
disability to be expected. In this case, however, defendant's agents
had also actively misrepresented plaintiff's condition to him. 104
Precisely what facts need to be concealed to prevent the statute
of limitations from running remains unsettled. If the defendant
has caused plaintiff's injury and, by active concealment of facts
which otherwise would have come to plaintiff's attention, successfully prevents him from learning that he is injured, clearly the
limitation period should be postponed.105 On the other hand,
where the defendant merely fails to diagnose accurately a pre-existing injury or illness without intending to mislead or hinder inquiry, the cause of action-for failing to disclose the fact of injury
-has not been concealed.106 In one case, although the plaintiff
had notice that he was suffering some ill effects from radiation
treatments, the defendant's representations that no injurious results
would follow were held to be a sufficient ground for tolling the
statute, providing the plaintiff could not have discovered the facts
with reasonable diligence.107 However, absent a confidential relationship it seems unlikely that the defendant very often would
have more information than the plaintiff about the extent and
101 See Developments in the Law, supra note 76, at 1221; Annot., 173 A.L.R. 576, 585
(1948). An example of a statutory duty to disclose would be the obligation of a motorist
to stop and give his name to the other party, and even offer assistance in case of physical
injury, whenever he is involved in a collision.
102 E.g., Saffold v. Scarborough, 91 Ga. App. 628, 86 S.E.2d 649 (1955); Hinkle v. Har•
gens, 76 S.D. 520, 81 N.W.2d 888 (1957). But see Buchanan v. Kull, 323 Mich. 381, 35
N.W.2d 351 (1949). See also Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368, 400-14 (1961).
103 E.g., Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590 (1948); Rosane v. Senger, 112
Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944).
104 Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 226, 153 P.2d 325 (1944).
105 See Developments in the Law, supra note 76, at 1221.
106 Eschenbacher v. Hier, 363 Mich. 676, 110 N.W .2d 731 (1961).
101 Hudson v. Shoulders, 164 Tenn. 70, 45 S.W.2d 1072 (1932). But see Ogg v. Robb,
181 Iowa 145, 162 N.W. 217 (1917).
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nature of the latter's injuries, unless, of course, defendant knew
that it had negligently exposed plaintiff to a damaging quantity
of a deleterious substance, e.g., nuclear radiation. One further element necessary for the prosecution of a claim is the identity of the
wrongdoer, and, although it may seem contrary to our adversary
system, there are circumstances in which the defendant's failure
to identify himself to the plaintiff constitutes conduct so improper
that the limitation will be postponed.108
In one of the early cases involving a claim for radiation injuries, La Porte v. United States Radium Corp.,1°0 the plaintiff
filed a bill in equity to enjoin the defendant from asserting the
statute of limitations as a defense on grounds of fraudulent concealment. The bill was dismissed because the court found that
there was not sufficient knowledge or reason to believe that a hazard existed at the time the injury was incurred or even during
the limitation period. Thus, the defendant could not have been
under a duty to disclose a hazard of which it could not have been
aware. Even today the state of knowledge regarding the amount
of radiation which will cause some physical harm is uncertain;
indeed, there are many conflicting theories regarding all of the
possible effects of radioactivity on human cells. Moreover, the La
Porte reasoning could be applied to a circumstance in which the
defendant had no knowledge, or reason to know, that it had exposed a particular individual. As the law now stands, therefore,
it would seem that an allegation of fraudulent concealment based
solely on a failure to notify of radiation exposure will seldom be
successful, absent a confidential relationship.
3. Special Circumstances
When a timely suit is prevented or stayed by a legislative act
or an injunction, the statute of limitations usually is tolled,11°
Moreover, the plaintiff is frequently granted additional time to
file a new action where his suit has failed-for example, because
the action was instituted against the wrong party111--or where
judgment was reversed, other than on the merits. 112
108 E.g., Kurry v. Frost, 204 Ark. 386, 162 S.W.2d 48 (1942) (defendant did not disclose
that she, rather than her husband, was the hit-and-run driver who injured plaintiff).
100 13 F. Supp. 263 (D.N.J. 1935).
110 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 24 (Smith-Hurd 1956); S.C. CODE § 10-llO (1962).
111 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN, § 52-593 (1960).
112 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 35 (1958); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 205. Less common, but
appearing in a significant number of statutes, is a provision suspending the limitation
applicable to a claim held by or against an alien, subject or citizen of any country at war
with the United States. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.608 (1935).
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Arkansas has enacted a unique statute permitting a party to
preserve a cause of action against an unknown tortfeasor by filing
a complaint within the limitation period against John Doe.113 In
contrast to other tolling provisions, the pl_ainti:ff is here required
to undertake certain formal steps, i.e., file a complaint and an affidavit that the true defendant's identity is unknown, rather than
merely being allowed to acquire the benefits of suspension of the
limitation because of his own incapacity or the defendant's conduct. Such a provision is especially relevant to radiation cases in
which the injured party is aware that he was overexposed but is
uncertain as to the party responsible. Even in a situation in which
a person first has notice of a possible radiation injury when there
is a physical manifestation such as cancer or leukemia, he might
be permitted to bring a John Doe action to preserve his claim
until the actual defendant can be determined, providing, however,
that the court would say that his cause of action did not accrue
until he received some notice of his claim.

C. When a Wrongful Death Action Is Barred
Although at common law a right of action could not be
founded upon the death of a person, and the death of either party
terminated liability for personal torts, in all American jurisdictions statutes have been enacted to rectify both situations.114 "Survival acts" make it possible to maintain or continue a tort action
after the death of either the plaintiff or defendant, 115 while "death
acts" permit recovery for damages sustained as a result of the decedent's death. Most of the states have adopted "death acts" modeled after England's Fatal Accident Act, 116 commonly referred to
as Lord Campbell's Act. There are three distinguishing features
in this type of statute: it creates a right of action for death caused
by a wrongful act, neglect or default, which, if death had not ensued, would have entitled the decedent to maintain an action and
recover damages; the action is for the exclusive benefit of specified persons, usually limited to the immediate family of the deceased; and the damages recoverable are such as result to the beneficiaries from the death.111 Although otherwise similar to Lord
113 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-234-36 (1962).
114 See PROSSER, TORTS 705 (2d ed. 1955).
115 See generally Evans, A Comparative Study

of the Statutory Survival of Tort Claims
For and Against Executors and Administrators, 29 MICH. L. REv. 969 (1931}; Note, 48
HARV. L. REv. 1008 (1935).
116 9 &: IO Viet., c. 93 (1846).
117 TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL Acr § 22 (2d ed. 1913). The state statutes may
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Campbell's Act, a few state statutes create a cause of action in favor
of the decedent's estate or have been construed as allowing an action to be maintained notwithstanding the nonexistence of the
persons for whose benefit the action is primarily given.118 A third
type of "death act" is clearly distinguishable since it merely authorizes the survival of the claim which decedent could have maintained, enlarging it to include the damages sustained by his estate
as a result of his death, rather than creating a new cause of action
for the damages suffered as a consequence of decedent's passing.119
Nuclear radiation not only causes physical injury, such as cancer, but it also shortens the normal life expectancy of persons who
are overexposed.120 Even if a decedent had never suffered an illness directly attributable to radiation, his family may be able to
recover their loss resulting from his early death. Of course, although the decedent suffered a radiation-induced injury, he may
have been unable to recover because his action was barred. Therefore, it is imperative to examine two limitation problems which
may be particularly relevant in radiation cases; when does the statute of limitations for a wrongful death action begin to run, and
what is the effect on such an action if decedent's claim was timebarred.

1. Commencement of the Limitation Period
Generally, a special statute of limitations governs wrongful
death actions. Although each case will be determined on the basis
of the particular language of the applicable limitation provision,
the great weight of judicial authority holds that the statutory period begins at the time of death. 121 This result is usually reached
whether the limitation statute requires that suit be filed within
a specified period (without mention of any point of time from
which the period is to be computed), from the date the cause of
action "accrued," or within a specified time after death. 122 Howvary in the following respects: (1) the members of the family for whose benefit an action
may be brought, (2) the person in whose name it may be brought (Lord Campbell's Act
designated the decedent's personal representative as the proper party), (3) the time within
which an action must be filed, (4) the manner of distributing the recovery, and (5) the
measure of damages, i.e., limitations on recovery. Id. § 24.
118 See id. § 25.
110 E.g., CONN. GEN.

STAT. ANN. § 52-555 (1960); see Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144
Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957).
120 See ATOMS AND THE LAw 270.
121 See Annot., 174 A.L.R. 815, 817 (1947).
122 E.g., St. Francis Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, 159 Fla. 453, 31 So. 2d 710 (1947) (within
specified time); Western &: A.R.R. v. Bass, 104 Ga. 390, 30 S.E. 874 (1898) (from date of
"accrual'); Naticchioni v. Felter, 54 Ohio App. 180, 6 N.E.2d 764 (1936) (after death).
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ever, if the applicable "death act" is of the type which merely
enlarges the decedent's claim to include damages for death, the
limitation period would logically start at the time decedent was
injured, i.e., when his cause of action for personal injuries accrued.123 Limitation provisions specifically governing only a wrongful death action are usually not tolled by circumstances which
would suspend general statutes of limitations.124
The limitation period for bringing a wrongful death action
will not create any unique problems in radiation cases so long as
those for whose benefit the right of action is given know that the
decedent was irradiated and can thus press their claim against a
known defendant. When the actual cause of death is unknown,
however, the relatively short statutory period, usually one or two
years, will probably preclude recovery for a defendant's wrongful
overexposure of the decedent. There is no authority for the proposition that a limitation governing an action to recover for death
will start to run only after the cause of death is determined. 125
The more significant question is what effect the fact that decedent's
claim for personal injuries was barred will have upon the new
cause of action in favor of his beneficiaries.

2. Effect of Decedent's Action Being Barred
There is general agreement that most defenses which would
have barred the decedent's claim for personal injuries will defeat
an action founded on his death resulting from those injuries. 126
Although the opposite conclusion might have been expected, since
"death acts" typically create a new cause of action for the benefit
of designated survivors, the prevailing view is usually supported
on the theory that a right is created only in the event that defendant's wrongful conduct would have entitled the decedent to maintain an action if death had not ensued.127 Even a prior judgment
in a suit by the decedent for his personal injuries or a release of
his claim will generally operate as a bar to a later wrongful death
action. 128 On the other hand, several courts have held that a wrong123 E.g., Gardner v. Beck, 195 Iowa 62, 189 N.W. 962 (1922). But see Thompson v.
New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 145 La. 805, 83 So. 19 (1919).
124 E.g., Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958). See generally 35 N.D.L. REv.
171 (1959).
125 But cf. McGhee v. Chesapeake&: O.R.R., 173 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Mich. 1959) (decedent's claim for personal injuries did not accrue until there was reason to discover
that he had an occupational disease, which was not until the autopsy).
126 See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 114, at 716-18.
127 See text accompanying note 117 supra.
128 E.g., Perry's Adm'x v. Louisville&: N.R.R., 199 Ky. 396, 251 S.W. 202 (1923) (judg-
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ful death action can still be maintained even though the limitation
had run against decedent's claim while he was living. 129
In support of the conclusion that decedent's action being
barred has no effect on a suit for his death, the principal argument frequently focuses upon the independent nature of the wrongful death action. The qualifying statutory language to the effect
that decedent must have been able to maintain an action if death
had not ensued, merely relates to the nature of the defendant's
conduct; he must have committed an actionable tort. As further
proof of the independence of the wrongful death action, emphasis
is occasionally placed on the difference in the measure of damages
between decedent's claim for personal injuries and the survivors'
damages resulting from his death. 130 In the former, the person
injured sues for physical harm, mental suffering, and impairment
of earning power up to the time of trial and in the future; the
latter action compensates the beneficiaries of his estate for the destruction of his ability to earn income with which to support them
subsequent to the time of death. Furthermore, reliance may be
placed upon the fact that death is a necessary condition for the
accrual of this right of action, and therefore suit should not be
barred before the claim arises. 131 Cases holding that an earlier
judgment for or against the deceased or a release of his claim bars
a subsequent wrongful death action are usually distinguished on
the ground that either of those events extinguishes the cause of action, while statutes of limitations are considered as only barring
the remedy and as not affecting the right. 132 When the statutory
language suggests that the action is for the death, rather than for
the tort causing the death, additional support is given to the view
that a limitations bar against decedent's action does not defeat the
claim for the benefit of the designated survivors. 133 However, those
courts refusing to entertain suits founded on the death if decedent's action had been barred frequently emphasize the statutory
requirement that the decedent must have been able to maintain an
ment for decedent); Libera v. Whitaker, Clark & Daniels, 20 N.J. Super. 292, 89 A.2d 734
(Essex County Ct. 1952) (release). But see De Hart, Adm'r v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 84 Ohio
App. 62, 85 N.E.2d 586 (1948) (dictum).
120 See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note ll4, at 718, where it is said that a majority of
courts so hold. See generally 42 !LL. L. REv. 688 (1947); Annot., 167 A.L.R. 894 (1947).
130 E.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Simrall's Adm'r, 127 Ky. 55, 104 S.W. 1011 (1907).
131 E.g., Wilson v. Jackson Hill Coal & Coke, 48 Ind. App. 150, 95 N.E. 589 (1911).
132 E.g., Childers v. Eagle Picher Lead Co., 35 F. Supp. 702 (W .D. Mo. 1940); see 2
HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1297 (1956).
133 E.g., Parker v. Fies & Sons, 243 Ala. 348, IO So. 2d 13 (1942); see Annot., 167
A.L.R. 894, 906 (1947).
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action if death had not ensued. 184 Clearly, the deceased could not
have sustained his claim if the statute of limitations had run. Occasionally the argument is advanced that the wrongful death action
is "derivative," and therefore dependent upon the continued existence of a right of action in the injured party.135 This argument
would seem to be especially persuasive in those situations in which
the decedent's cause of action was statutorily created and the limitation provision specifically governed the right, for such a limitation is usually considered to be a condition which extinguishes the
right rather than merely bars the remedy. In addition, reliance
may be placed upon decisions in which a wrongful death action
was barred because decedent's claim was not maintainable on the
merits or had been released. It may be argued that these defenses
to decedent's claim are indistinguishable from the statute of limitations, since any of them would have to have been affirmatively
pleaded by the defendant.136 Furthermore, if the survivors are
allowed to prosecute a claim for defendant's wrongful conduct in
the distant past, there is judicial concern about undermining the
policies behind limitations statutes.137 Finally, it seems apparent
that if the "death act" upon which the claim is based merely enlarges the decedent's cause of action, the claim for death will be
?a?'e~ when the limitation has run on the action for personal
mJunes.
In those jurisdictions in which a statutory bar of decedent's
claim will not preclude the survivors' action for his death, defendants will be less likely to escape all liability for radiation injuries.
Although the radiation victim will not benefit directly, such an
approach will alleviate some of the harsh effects resulting from
the usual interpretation of the accrual of an action for delayedmanifestation injuries. At least the survivors, who probably will
have also suffered the impact of the expensive care for illnesses
such as cancer or leukemia, will obtain some recompense for loss
of income from the decedent's early death. But in states in which
the decedent's claim must have been maintainable in order to
sustain an action for the death, the beneficiaries must bear the
entire financial burden of both a costly injury and the loss of income after death, while the person whose wrongful conduct caused
the decedent to be irradiated is free from any legally enforceable
134 E.g., Piukkula v. Pillsbury Astoria Flouring Mills, 150 Ore. 304, 42 P .2d 921 (1935);
Street v. Consumers Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 39 S.E.2d 271 (1946).
135 E.g., Flynn v. N.Y., N.H. &: H.R.R., 283 U.S. 53 (1931); see 2 HAlu>ER &: JAMES,
op. cit. supra note 132, at 1297.
136 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
137 See 42 ILL. L. REV. 688, 690-91 (1947).
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liability. This consequence cannot be fairly rationalized by saying
that there are always a few hard cases when certainty is sought, for
virtually all radiation cases will create hardship for plaintiffs under
most existing statutes of limitations.

D. Which Limitation Governs
In selecting the applicable limitation provision, problems of
choice of the appropriate statute may arise in three different contexts. First, if the cause of action arose in a jurisdiction other than
the forum, selection of the applicable statute will be governed by
conflict of laws principles. The choice of law in this context is
usually decided on the basis of whether the statute of limitations
is to be characterized as procedural or substantive. Secondly, since
no jurisdiction has only one limitation period for all actions, after
the decision has been made as to which state's law shall control,
the applicable limitation provision in that state must be determined. Generally, the choice in this context will be governed by
the characterization of the plaintiff's claim, either in terms of the
nature of the injury or the common-law form of action. Finally,
when an action is brought in federal district court, with jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, the problem to be resolved
is whether federal or state law should control, including the
question of which conflicts rules are to be applied. Again, as in the
first context, the choice is now governed by characterizing the
statute of limitations as either procedural or substantive. However, a limitation statute is usually characterized as procedural in
the former and as substantive in the latter context.
Undoubtedly, questions regarding the applicable limitation
statute will frequently arise in radiation cases. Accidents during
shipment of radioactive materials or improper disposal of waste
products would very likely involve parties from different states.
Moreover, the increased mpbility of the population will probably
result in numerous instances of injured persons having moved to
another state between the time they were exposed and when they
first experience any significant injuries. Thus, it seems especially
appropriate to examine existing choice of law principles in each
of the above-mentioned contexts, since they are likely to be relevant in many radiation damage suits.
1. Characterization for the Con-ftict of Laws

If suit is barred by the forum's statute of limitations, an action
generally cannot be maintained even though it could still be
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brought in the state in which the right accrued.188 Conversely, an
action may be maintainable in the forum although it is barred
where the cause of action arose. 139 This "forum rule" stems from
the theory that general statutes of limitations, affecting only the
remedy and not the right, are procedural rather than rules of
substance. Moreover, they reflect a determination by the forum's
legislature as to the period of time, following the occurrence of
the events giving rise to a plaintiff's claim, after which its courts
no longer can operate effectively and render a fair judgment.Ho
The lex fori also determines when the cause of action accrued,m
which of the forum's statutes is applicable142 and whether the
limitation period was tolled. 143
Exceptions to this "forum rule" have been created by both
courts and legislatures. Limitations which bar a specific statutory
claim, especially one not recognized at common law, are usually
construed as extinguishing the right rather than merely barring
the remedy. 144 Therefore, a forum will not entertain such a foreign
cause of action which is barred by the lex loci, even though the
forum's legislature has created a similar right which would not be
barred, because the foreign limitation is deemed to be substantive
and thus an integral part of the right itself. 145 Of course, interpretative problems may arise in attempting to determine whether the
foreign limitation is actually a condition of the right. 146
However, when the situation is reversed, i.e., when the statutory claim would be barred by the forum's statute of limitations
138 REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 603 (1934). See generally 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAws § 604.1 (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 85 (3d ed. 1949); HANCOCK, TORTS IN
THE CONFLICT OF LAws 133-37 (1942); Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws,
31 MICH. L. R.Ev. 474 (1933); Comment, The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of
Laws, 28 YALE L.J. 492 (1919).
139 REsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 138, § 604.
140 See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1177,
1260 (1950).
141 E.g., Thomas Iron Co. v. Ensign-Bickford ed., 131 Conn. 665, 42 A.2d 145 (1945).
142 E.g., Alropa Corp. v. Rossee, 86 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1936).
143 E.g., Western Coal &: Mining Co. v. Hilvert, 63 Ariz. 171, 160 P.2d 331 (1945).
144 E.g., Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
145 See REsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 138, § 605; Developments in the Law, supra
note 140, at 1261.
146 In Boumias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955), the court
discussed various tests which have been applied in deciding whether the foreign limitation is procedural or substantive. Illustratively, if the limitation provision is directed
to the statutory claim so specifically as to warrant concluding that it qualifies the right,
then the foreign statute will be regarded as substantive. See Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451
(1904). See also Maki v. George R. Cooke Co., 124 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1942), where the
"specificity" test was found to be satisfied by a separate statute limiting all statutory
rights. Cf. Myers v. Stevenson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 399, 270 P.2d 885 (1954).
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but not by the lex loci, the decisions are split.147 If the lex fori is
applied in these circumstances, the result is often supported on
the grounds that a foreign statutory claim should not be treated
more favorably than a common-law right, and that the forum's
policy has been established by the legislature and should be followed in adjudicating such statutory claims, whether foreign or
local. 148 On the other hand, when a court applies the longer foreign
limitation, it frequently emphasizes that comity should prevail
over local policy in these circumstances. In addition, it has been
suggested that the forum's legislature, in creating a similar statutory right, intended that the forum limitation should govern only
local actions and should not be applied to like claims arising in
another state. 149 If state legislatures decide to enact special legislation establishing grounds for liability for exposing third persons to
radiation, and a new limitation period is adopted to apply to such
a statutory cause of action, the decision as to which state's statute
of limitations will apply could be decisive in a given case. Undoubtedly there will be significant differences in the time periods
finally enacted once legislatures do attempt some resolution of the
complex problems arising from widespread commercial use of
radioactive materials. 150
The general "forum rule" has also been substantially modified
in at least forty states by legislation which is commonly referred
to as "borrowing" statutes. 151 If the forum's limitation has not run
on a foreign claim,152 then the "borrowing" provision directs the
courts to look to some foreign law, usually either the lex loci or
147 Compare Zellmer v. Acme Brewing Co., 184 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1950), with Theroux
v. Northern Pac. R.R., 64 F. 84 (8th Cir. 1894). See generally STOMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF
CoNFUcr OF L\ws 144-45 (1937); R.EsrATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 138, § 397, comment b;
Annot., 68 A.L.R. 217 (1930).
148 The full faith and credit clause (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I) does not require the
forum to apply the longer foreign limitation, even though it applies specifically to the
statutory right. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
140 See HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 138, at 134-35.
150 A Model Nuclear Facilities Liability Act, including a statute of limitations pro•
vision, has been adopted by the Conference on Uniform State Laws. See NAT'L CONFER·
ENCE OF Cor.m'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK 228 (1961).
151 E.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. IO, § 8120 (1953). For a recent discussion of these statutes,
see Comment, 47 VA. L. REv. 299 (1961). Enactment of "borrowing" statutes was prompted
by the decreased frequency with which the bar of the forum's limitation could be invoked because of the practically universal (all but Louisiana) existence of tolling P,rovisions suspending the operation of statutes of limitations during the nonresidence or, in
a few jurisdictions, even the temporary absence of the defendant. Note, Legislation Governing the Applicability of Foreign Statutes of Limitation, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 762, 762-64
(1935).
152 With the exception of Kentucky, the "borrowing" provisions a:re applied only
when the forum statute has not run; otherwise the foreign legislation is disregarded and
the general lex fori rule is applied. Annot., 75 A.L.R. 203, 231 (1931).
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that of the residence of one or both of the parties,153 to determine
whether or not the action would have been barred if brought
there. In applying the foreign statute, the decisions of that sister
state will be followed in deciding, for example, when the right of
action accrued, whether the action was tolled, and which of the
foreign statutes is applicable.154 Both the judicial exception for
foreign statutory claims and the widespread enactment of "borrowing" statutes have significantly affected the impact of the "forum
rule" and consequently reduced the incentive for plaintiffs to
forum-shop when their claims are stale and would be barred by
the lex loci. Thus, even though a party suffering a radiationinduced injury may find a forum in which the defendant can be
served with process, and analogous judicial authority which supports the argument that his action did not accrue until he knew of
his injury,165 he may be defeated by the limitation where the claim
arose. In effect, whenever multiple jurisdictions have a contact
with the parties and the cause of action, the plaintiff will usually
be barred if one of those states would preclude him from bringing
an action.

2. Characterization of the Plaintiff's Claim
Typically, states have established one general limitation period
to cover actions for any injury to the person or rights of another
not arising from contract and not otherwise enumerated.156 Suits
to recover for malpractice of physicians and others rending medical
treatment,157 as well as for trespass to the person,158 are frequently
prescribed by a specific limitation. However, a few states have retained the common-law action on the case to designate the provisions applicable to personal injury claims,159 while some others
include such claims under a blanket section covering all actions
not otherwise specifically provided for. 160 Other statutory classifica153 See N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65 (F) 58-59 (1943). Frequently "borrowing" statutes except actions brought by resident plaintiffs. E.g., Du.
CoDE ANN. tit. 10, § 8120 (1953). Such a provision is not repugnant to the privileges and
immunities clause in U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 2. Canadian No. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553
(1920).
15-l See Annot., supra note 152, at 227; Note, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 762, 770 (1935).
155 See discussion in Part A supra.
156 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05 (1962).
157 E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.140 (1949).
158 E.g., A.LA. CODE tit. 7, § 21 (1958).
169 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-206 (1962); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 87-1-11 (1953); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 57, § 1 (1957).
160 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4) (1960); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 112, § 90 (Supp. 1959);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 722 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(2) (1953).
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tions which might be relevant to litigation involving nuclear mishaps include general limitation provisions which apply to liabilities
created by statute where no particular limitation specifically conditions the statutory right,1 61 and the separate categories applicable to actions for injury to property, both real and personal.162
Because there are substantial variations in the limitation periods
governing different types of actions or injuries, characterization of
the plaintiff's claim may be determinative in a given case.
Illustratively, in Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co.163
an action was brought by an employee to recover for personal
injuries caused by the prolonged inhalation of silica dust. While the
counts based on the defendant's negligence were barred, the court
entertained suit on the last count, which charged the employer
with failure to provide safeguards required by New York's Labor
Law. 164 That statute was construed as placing a duty on the defendant not measured by the usual standard of the reasonably prudent
man; rather, it imposed an absolute duty to provide adequate and
proper safeguards. Although the court characterized the action as
one for recovery upon a liability created by statute and thus applied the longer limitation period165 to the last count, it qualified
the holding as follows:
"We may assume that a 'liability' is not 'created' by statute
in every case where the statute imposes a new duty or standard
of care different from that required by custom and common
law. The statute may be general in character and the statutory duty may be imposed for the general welfare rather than
for benefit of a person or group of persons. A statute 'creates'
no liability unless it discloses an intention express or implied
that from disregard of a statutory command a liability for
resultant damages shall arise 'which would not exist but for
the statute.' " 166
Obviously this qualification is significant; moreover, contrary
authority exists even though the higher statutory standards were
enacted for the protection of a special class.167 Nevertheless, because
161 E.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 12.080 (1961).
162 For example, distinctions are usually

made between actions to recover for injury
to real property and those for damages resulting from nuisance. See, e.g., Robertson v.
Cincinnati, N.O. &: Tex. Pac. Ry., 339 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. 1960), 28 TENN. L. REv. 433 (1961).
163 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936).
164 N.Y. LABOR LAW § 299.
165 N.Y. Crv. PRAc. ACT § 213 (six years).
166 270 N.Y. 287, 304-05, 200 N.E. at 829.
167 E.g., Shelton v. Paris, 199 Ore. 365, 261 P.2d 856 (1953). See generally Annot.,
104 A.L.R. 462 (1936).
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of the numerous statutes and regulations imposing special standards of care on operators of nuclear facilities, the argument could
still be made that a statutory liability is created when injury results from the violation of any such rules. Although such regulatory
legislation will usually be of the type intended to protect the
general public, a court might be willing to apply the longer
limitation period governing statutory claims without accepting the
exact analysis of the Schmidt decision.
Radiation damage to real estate may create another situation
in which the characterization of plaintiff's claim will determine the
applicable limitation period. Historically, the distinction between
trespass and an action on the case for invasion of land depended on
whether the invasion was direct or indirect. Trespass is usually
defined as interference with the owner's exclusive possession of
land, while nuisance is regarded as an interference with the use and
enjoyment of real property. Unless an actor is engaged in an extrahazardous activity, an unintentional and nonnegligent invasion of
another's land usually does not subject him to liability to the
possessor, despite the fact that harm results. 168 Courts generally
require an intrusion of real property in some palpable form before it will be deemed a trespass. 169 The Oregon Supreme Court,
however, declined to make such a qualification. In Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co. 110 fluoride compounds in gaseous form, not visible to the naked eye, escaped from defendant's plant and were
carried onto plaintiff's land during a period of about five years.
Plaintiff's cattle were poisoned from ingesting the fluorides, which
had contaminated the forage and water on the land. Defendant
contended that the invasion was a nuisance, trying to limit recovery to damages resulting during the two years prior to suit, the
statutory period for such an action. 171 The court rejected defendant's theory, saying:
"If, then, we must look to the character of the instrumentality which is used in making an intrusion upon another's
land we prefer to emphasize the object's energy or force rather
than its size. Viewed in this way we may define trespass as any
intrusion which invades the possessor's protected interest in
exclusive possession, whether that intrusion is by visible or
R.EsTATEMENT, TORTS § 166 (1934).
35 WASH. L. REv. 474 (1960).
221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1960).
ORE. REv. STAT. § 12.II0 (1961); cf. Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41
Wash. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952).
168
169
170
171
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invisible pieces of matter or by energy which can be measured
only by the mathematical language of the physicist."172
Holding that the defendant's conduct which caused chemical substances to be deposited upon the plaintiff's land fulfilled all of the
requirements under the law of trespass, the court applied the
six-year limitation for trespass to land178 in lieu of the two-year
limit on an action for nuisance. Obviously, such a decision provides
direct authority for a radiation case.
3. Characterization in Federal Courts

Since Congress has never enacted general statutes of limitations
for actions brought in federal courts based on state-created rights,
state limitations have always been applied in such cases, and the
Rules of Decision Act174 provided the authority for so doing.175
If the suit was one to enforce a common-law right, the federal
courts followed the "forum rule," applying the limitations of the
state in which they were sitting.176 However, when the cause of
action was based upon statutory liability, and the statute contained
a special limitation conditioning the right, the entire state act was
enforced, even though the claim arose in a state other than that in
which the federal court was sitting. 177 In applying the states'
limitations, federal courts also followed state decisions in interpreting the statutes.178
Since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 179 only a few significant changes
have occurred in the manner in which federal courts handle problems of time limitations. There have been some important developments with respect to actions for equitable relief, it being now
well settled that state limitations shall be applied whenever juris172 221 Ore. at 94, 342 P.2d at 794.
178 ORE. REv. STAT. § 12.080 (1961).
174 "[T]he laws of the several states,

except where the constitution, treaties or
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases
where they apply." Federal Judiciary Act § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (1789). The current act is in
28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1958).
171i See Blume &: George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49 MICH, L. REv. 937,
940 (1951).
176 Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 407 (1850); McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 312 (1839).
177 Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904).
178 See Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U.S. 647 (1893); Blume &: George, supra note 175, at
941.
179 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did
not affect the application of state time limitations. See Blume &: George, supra note 175,
at 948.
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diction is based on diversity of citizenship.180 However, if a federally-created right is involved, for which the sole remedy is in
equity, the state's statute does not control, and a federal court is
free to apply its own conception of the doctrine of laches.181 Indeed, federal law will always prevail when Congress has created a
statutory liability which is prescribed by a specific time limitation
in the federal act. 182 Three years after the Erie decision, the Supreme Court decided that federal courts must also follow the
forum state's conflict of laws rules. 183 Thus, in deciding which
limitation it must apply in a diversity case, a federal court will
first characterize the statute as "substantive" for purposes of the
Erie doctrine, and then characterize it as "procedural" for purposes
of conflict of laws.
When a federally-created claim is involved, but no time limitation has been enacted specifically controlling the statutory right,
state limitations are usually applied.184 Uniformity is lacking in
the decisions, however, as to whether federal or state law should
govern statutory interpretation under these circumstances. On the
one hand, the Supreme Court has stated that the decision as to
when the cause of action "accrued" is a federal question; 185 however, when the Court was confronted with a case which called for
an interpretation of where the claim "arose" to determine which
state statute was applicable according to the forum state's "borrowing" provision, the Court looked to state law in deciding the
issue.186 But in suits involving state-created rights, problems of
statutory construction are to be resolved in accordance with state
court decisions.187
It would seem, therefore, that no difference in result can be
expected when an action to recover for radiation-induced injuries
is filed in federal district court, jurisdiction being based on diversity of citizenship. However, when the forum state's courts have
not specifically decided the issue of when a cause of action accrues
for a delayed manifestation injury, a federal court might be more
180
181

Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), 44 MICH. L. R.Ev. 477 (1945).
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); cf. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461

(1947).
Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926).
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
State limitations are applied since it seems unlikely that Congress intended to
create a class of perpetual rights. See Developments in the Law, supra note 140, at 1266.
185 Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96 (1941).
186 Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947).
187 West v. American Tel. &: Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Pickett v. Aglinski, 110
F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1940).
182
188
184
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willing to look to federal cases, such as Urie v. Thompson, 188 for
analogies in deciding the question in a radiation case.189
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of the foregoing discussion is to demonstrate the
need for a better solution to the problem of the effect of statutes
of limitations in tort cases involving radiation injuries. Application
of existing statutory periods and the usual interpretation of when
a cause of action accrues will make it difficult, if not impossible,
to recover on many meritorious claims arising from delayed manifestation injuries. Even in those states in which the judiciary has
employed the concept of notice of an injury to the claimant as a
prerequisite for accrual, the solution is not entirely adequate. Not
only is there a lack of uniformity in the decisions as to what constitutes sufficient notice, but such a doctrine ignores the unfairness
to defendants in failing to establish an over-all maximum period
within which an action must be brought. Moreover, statutory tolling provisions and judicially-created rules suspending the limitation period can be invoked only in particular situations and cannot
be relied upon to achieve a just solution in many radiation cases.
Since time limitations for commencing actions at law are entirely
statutory, the only logical solution is legislative reform.
Assuming that some change is desirable, decisions must be
made as to whether action should be taken at the federal or state
level and what basic ideas should be recommended. One writer
has proposed that a federal limitation be enacted in conjunction
with an act creating a federal cause of action based upon strict
liability.100 On the other hand, it has been suggested that uniform
state legislation would be the better solution, although a recommendation of congressional action was also indicated.191 A single
federal statute would certainly offer the advantage of immediate
uniformity throughout the country and thus avoid the possibility
of continuing disparateness in limitation periods and interpretations of when the statutory period starts to run. The current congressional attitude, however, seems to favor state regulation of
tort liability for radiation injuries. Moreover, some radiation
337 U.S. 163 (1949); see text accompanying note 52 supra.
See, e.g., Sylvania Elec. Prods. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955). But cf.
Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1952).
100 Seavey, Torts and Atoms, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 3, 12 (1956).
101 McNeal, Bloom, Christovich, Cope, Cull, & Dejarnette, The Statute of Limitations
Problem in Relation to Atomic Energy Liability, 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 347, 360 (1959).
188
180
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source~ might not come within Congress' power to regulate. 192
Consequently, the proposals suggested below are directed to state
legislators with the hope that some uniformity can be achieved
with regard to certain basic principles, realizing that exact limitation periods will probably vary from state to state.
To be reasonable, a limitation statute applicable to radiation
injuries should provide an over-all period of thirty years from the
date of exposure. The Commissioners for Uniform State Laws have
proposed a model statute prescribing an over-all limitation of ten
years from the exposure date, 193 but this is unrealistic in view of
current scientific knowledge of the delayed biological effects of
nuclear radiation. Even if the limitation period is extended, the
issue of when the statute commences to run remains unsettled unless the traditional language of accrual is replaced by a more
specific event to mark the beginning of the period. Therefore, the
over-all limitation period should be measured from the date of
exposure or, if there is a succession of exposures, from the date of
the last exposure which contributed to the damage suffered by the
claimant.
Merely lengthening the limitation period would be a substantial benefit to potential plaintiffs, but it creates an undue burden
upon defendants who might be amenable to suits for an extended
time without knowledge of the number or amounts of possible
claims. Some writers have suggested an alternative limitation
measured from the date when the injured party knows, or should
know in the exercise of ordinary care, the nature of his injury and
the source of the radiation, with a time limit of one or two years. 194
It would appear, however, that such a provision would apply only
after a physical manifestation of injury and hence does not necessarily protect the defendant in that situation in which the plaintiff
knew he was exposed but suffered no actual injury for several
years. On the other hand, "injury" could be interpreted to include
the mere exposure to harmful amounts of radiation; thus a claim
would be barred if suit were not filed within two years after knowledge of exposure. Such an interpretation places a potential claimant in the same precarious position as under present limitations
statutes, forcing him to prove future damages which may be highly
192 ATOMS AND THE LAw 574. See also Estep 8: Adelman, State Control of Radiation
Hazards: An Intergovernmental Relations Problem, 60 MICH. L. REv. 41 (1961).

193 UNIFORM NucLEAR FACILITIES LIABILITY Aar § 5. For a discussion of statutes and
conventions adopted in Europe to govem limitation periods for radiation cases, see Comment, 13 STAN. L. REv. 865, 869 (1961).
194 E.g., McNeal, Bloom, Christovich, Cope, Cull, 8: Dejarnette, supra note 191, at 360.
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speculative, if no physical effect is manifested shortly after he is
exposed. Therefore, it is assumed that the former interpretation of
"injury," i.e., a physical manifestation of compensable damage,
would or at least should be adopted.
In order to protect defendants adequately, potential claimants
who have been exposed to radiation should be required to give as
early notice as possible even if there are no observable physical
manifestations. Both parties may benefit substantially from such
a notice requirement. The potential plaintiff could be advised as
to precautions which he should take against further exposure and
possibly could receive medical treatment from radiation specialists
provided or recommended by the potential defendant. Advantages
accruing to the prospective defendant include the opportunity to
mitigate damages by providing medical care or periodic examinations to ascertain diseases at the incipient stage and the opportunity
to preserve evidence of the incident which allegedly resulted in the
claimant's exposure. To enforce the notice requirement, the recommended statute would include an alternate limitation period
of six months or one year after the injured party knows or, in the
exercise of ordinary care, should know that he was exposed to
nuclear radiation and the source of the radiation. If the claimant
does not comply with the statutory procedure for giving notice
within the specified time, and the potential defendant is not aware
that this particular person was exposed, any cause of action arising
from such exposure would be barred.
As a counterpart to a provision for notice to the defendant, it
is recommended that some provision be made to inform persons
who have been exposed to radiation. This should take the form of
filing a report with the appropriate regulatory agency of all incidents which could possibly endanger persons or property not
associated with the ownership and operation of the radiation
source. In addition, if only a limited area or group of persons was
exposed, personal notice should be given to the victims either by
the party responsible for the incident or by the agency. Disclosure
of incidents involving possible exposure of a substantial area or
segment of the population probably should be handled by public
officials.
Although it is contrary to our traditional adversary system to
require a party to give notice of a possible claim against himself
to those he may have injured, the peculiar nature of nuclear radiation and its delayed effects makes it imperative that some new procedures be adopted. To effectuate the requirement that notice be
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given by the potential defendant, the statute of limitations should
provide that the period will not begin until the defendant has complied with the specified notice filing procedure if he knows or, in
the exercise of ordinary care, should know of the incident causing
the alleged injury. As a consequence of the two notice provisions,
much of the hesitancy to adopt a thirty-year over-all limitation
period should be alleviated.
The modifications already suggested should provide for those
cases in which all physical manifestations are long delayed. Two
other types of cases must be considered, however, in which an
unconditional blanket thirty-year extension of the limitations
period would be unfair. If injurious and compensable injuries
occur at any time during the thirty-year period, suit should be
brought immediately, just as for nonradiation injuries. Whatever
the period generally applicable-six months, a year, or two yearsthe same limitation should apply to radiation injuries once the
plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care should know,
of the nature of the injury, causal connection to a particular radiation source, and the identity of the potential defendant. Establishment of the thirty-year period should not permit such a person any
additional time for bringing suit.
Creation of a thirty-year over-all period necessitates special
provision for a second category of cases. Some actionable manifestations of overexposure to radiation may appear long before the
thirty-year period, but other equally actionable consequences from
the same overexposure may be delayed for many years. Under the
typical judicial approach in tort cases a cause of action may not be
split, hence all damages for future injuries must be sought when
first seeking any recovery. This dilemma is difficult enough in
some nonradiation cases and will present almost impossible complications when radiation injuries are involved. The difficulties
created by application of existing case law have been discussed in
detail elsewhere, and a new contingent injury fund approach to
many radiation injury cases has been suggested.195 Until a significantly different solution is adopted, however, limitations provisions
under normal tort rules must be modified to take care of the case
in which some perhaps unknown, or at least uncertain-to-happen
manifestations may arise long after suit could have been brought
for the first clearly actionable manifestation. One solution would
195 Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to Injury
Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REv. 259 (1960). See also Estep & Forgotson, Legal Liability for
Genetic Injuries From Radiation, 24 LA. L. REv. 1 (1963).
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be simply to permit complete splitting of causes of action in all
such cases. Certainly this is preferable to either allowing juries or
judges to speculate about the possibilities of future effects or denying recovery altogether unless the chances are better than :fifty
percent.196 In most cases, however, this drastic splitting solution
will cause unnecessary duplication in trial of such cases. Instead,
a modified splitting of future and uncertain injuries from those
presently actionable should be permitted. Rather than an action
for these uncertain later manifestations, suit should be permitted
after actual manifestation of a specific new injury, provided it is
brought within the usual short time after manifestation and
knowledge of causal connection to defendant's radiation source,
and, in any event, within the over-all thirty-year period. This
solution will unsettle somewhat the present doctrines of :finality
in tort cases, but the existing rules clearly are unsatisfactory for
future injuries, particularly in radiation cases. The French have
been able to live with a similar kind of uncertainty, 197 and surely
we can do so when it is so important to justice in radiation cases.
The details of such a plan probably should be worked out on a
case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, the statutory modifications of limitations provisions should specifically direct the judiciary to change
the common-law rule. The statutory amendment should also direct
the courts to work out satisfactory rules as to the finality of that
part of the earlier trial which would be the same for all injuries
caused by the radiation overexposure. Use of some existing concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel might provide a solution in some jurisdictions, but this should not be left to chance.
When amending the rules by statute as here suggested, specific
direction should be given to the courts to make as much of the
earlier trial as possible conclusive in subsequent trials, and to permit only that evidence which would show the extent and causal
connection to radiation of the new injurious manifestations.
A few additional problems remain to be considered. The question of liability for genetic injuries has been considered elsewhere.198 Whether or not a cause of action is recognized, the limitation statute recommended above should be applied with the period
commencing on the date of the exposure of the ancestor. It should
be specified that the over-all limitation period cannot be tolled or
suspended for any reason other than the failure of the defendant
100 Ibid. See also ATOMS AND THE LAw 465-527.
107 ATOMS AND THE LAW 527·32.
108 See Estep &: Forgotson, supra note 195.
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to file the required report of a nuclear incident. This should not,
however, preclude a contract between parties providing for payment in the event an injury develops beyond the statutory period.
The amendment, however, should specifically preclude an action
against an unknown tort-feasor which would suspend the running
of the statute. Finally, it is recommended that all suits based upon
death acts be specifically barred within the over-all period of thirty
years following the exposure of the decedent.
Any proposal to extend substantially the statute of limitations
governing actions for personal injury damage may create an illusion that the responsible party in every case will now be amenable
to suit for thirty years. During such a period many potential defendants will have moved or disappeared and some corporations
will have been dissolved and liquidated.199 But these problems cannot be solved by a limitations provision; it is better not to foreclose
a remedy in every case merely because a few radiation victims may
fail to recover because of the disappearance of the responsible
party.200
Some steps must be taken to provide a realistic limitation period
for radiation injuries, keeping in mind the interests of both parties
involved in litigation and the public policy of proscribing stale
and fraudulent claims. The changes suggested here should correct
the most important defects of existing statutes. They should be considered and adopted by each jurisdiction.
199 Determining liability of directors and stockholders upon liquidation is sometimes
complicated but if properly carried out there would be no continuing liability after
liquidation. See LATIIN, CORPORATIONS ch. 12, § 11 (1959).
200 If the contingent injury fund suggested elsewhere were used this problem would
also be solved because contributions would be made immediately for increased possibili•
ties of future injuries. See material cited in notes 195, 196 supra.

